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Abstract
The increasing interest of policymakers and academics on non-tariff measures (NTMs) has
stimulated a growing literature on their effects on agri-food trade of African countries. The
empirical  evidence,  however,  are  ambiguous:  some studies  suggest  that  NTMs are  trade
barriers, others suggest they have a catalyst  role for trade.  Understanding the drivers of
these contrasting effects and the prevailing one would allow to draw important conclusions.
We review, through a meta-analytical approach, a set of empirical studies that quantify the
effects  of  NTMs on African agri-food trade.  We find  a prevalence  of  the  trade-impeding
effects. Our results also help explaining differences in NTMs’ effects due to methodological
and structural heterogeneity. Moreover the effects of NTMs vary across types of NTMs and
analysed commodities.
We  conclude  by  comparing  our  findings  with  existing  literature  and  emphasize  which
research areas deserve further investigation such as intra-Africa trade or trade effects  of
technical NTMs.
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On the impact of non-tariff measures on trade performances 
of African agri-food sector
Introduction
The  integration  of  African  countries  in  the  world  trading  system  strongly  depends  on
opportunities of market access at favourable conditions (i.e., lower trade costs) (Henson and
Loader 2001). Border-related trade costs are high for agri-food commodities, and appear to be
greater for Africa (Porteous 2017). The progressive liberalisation of agri-food trade, through
the  negotiations  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  has  increased  opportunities  of
market access and lowered traditional barriers to trade (i.e., tariffs) (Santeramo, Guerrieri, and
Lamonaca, 2019). Contemporaneously, concerns have been raised on the proliferation of non-
tariff  measures (NTMs) and on their  impacts  on trade (Fernandes,  Ferro,  and J.S. Wilson
2017;  Santeramo and Lamonaca,  2018).  Although the  main  scope of  NTMs is  to  correct
market  inefficiencies,  they  may  have  a  two-fold  role:  trade  catalysts  or  trade  barriers
(Nimenya,  Ndimiraand  and  de  Frahan  2012;  Santeramo  2017).  Facing  NTMs  may  be
particularly challenging for African countries, whose comparative advantages in the agri-food
products may be undermined, due to the lack of adequate financial and technical capacity to
comply with changing, and more stringent, requirements (Jaffee and Henson 2004; Martin
2018).
Several studies investigate the impacts of NTMs on African agri-food trade (e.g., Henson,
Brouder, and Mitullah 2000; Henson and Loader 2001; Otsuki, J.S. Wilson, and Sewadeh
2001a, b; J.S. Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Anders and Caswell 2009; Jongwanich 2009; Xiong
and Beghin 2011; Nimenya, Ndimira and de Frahan 2012; Shepherd and N.L. Wilson 2013).
The vast  majority  of  these  studies  are  product-,  country-,  or  NTM-specific,  which  imply
heterogeneous estimates and make difficult to draw general conclusions. We aim at answering
two enquiries: what is the prevailing effect of NTMs on African agri-food trade in literature?
Which factors affect the heterogeneity in the estimated effects of NTMs?
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The importance of these issues is attested by an increasing number of related review articles,
published in top journals, on the effects NTMs on global trade. Few reviews are quantitative
(e.g., Li and Beghin, 2012; Santeramo and Lamonaca, 2019); the vast majority are qualitative
(e.g., Beghin, Maertens, and Swinnen 2015), focused on specific categories of NTMs (e.g.,
Cipollina and Salvatici 2008) or on particular geographic areas (e.g., Salvatici, Matthews, and
Scoppola 2017). Differently a review on the influence of NTMs on trade performances of
African agri-food sector is currently lacking.
We review, through a meta-analytical approach, a set of empirical studies that quantify the
effects of NTMs on African agri-food trade, in order to disentangle the prevailing effect and
potential determinants of heterogeneity across studies.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides details on exports and NTMs in the
African  agri-food  sector.  Sections  3  and  4  describes  theoretical  and  empirical  issues:  in
particular,  the former deepens on the rationale of NTMs as trade barriers or catalysts; the
latter provides information on sources of data and econometric procedures. Qualitative and
quantitative  results  are  presented  and  discussed  in  section  5,  whereas  the  last  section
concludes providing empirical and policy implications.
Trade and non-tariff measures in African agri-food sector
The agri-food trade from developing countries  has progressively expanded since the mid-
1990s (Martin 2018): emblematic is the case of Africa. African exports grew exponentially
during the period 1995-2013, but suffered a setback since 2014 (UN Comtrade 2017). Along
with the increase in exports, the number of non-tariff measures (NTMs), and in particular of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs), against Africa has increased as well (UNCTAD
2017) (figure 1).
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Figure  1. Exports and non-tariff measures (NTMs), with a focus on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) in the
African agri-food sector, 1995-2016.
Source: elaboration on UN Comtrade (2017) and UNCTAD (2017).
Notes: The number of NTMs in force, classified according to countries’ income levels, is normalised by the number of
countries for each group. The list of African countries analysed and classified by income categories is in Appendix.
The rapid growth of exports may be due to the economic globalisation in commodity chains,
and  to  structural  changes  in  the  composition  of  agri-food  trade  (Henson,  Brouder,  and
Mitullah 2000; Maertens and Swinnen 2009): African countries have became export-oriented
economies, and moved the composition of exports from traditional (e.g., coffee, tea, sugar,
cocoa) to non-traditional,  high value commodities (e.g., fruit and vegetables, poultry, fish)
(Okello and Roy 2007; Rios et al. 2009). In twenty years exports have doubled for seafood
products and vegetables, and decoupled for meat, to the detriment of traditional exports (-43%
for coffee and tea, -33% for cocoa) (UN Comtrade 2017). It is worth noting that NTMs are
more frequent on non-traditional than on traditional commodities:  total  NTMs account for
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26% for fish, 15% for fruits and vegetables, and 11% for meat, whereas only 3% of total
NTMs affect traditional commodities (UNCTAD 2017).
The recent reduction of exports from Africa raises the question of potential marginalisation of
African  countries  in  international  trade.  However,  according  to  Bouet,  Mishra,  and  Roy
(2008), African exports performances depend on income levels: the lower the income, the
lower the traded values and the higher the average level of NTMs and SPSs (figure 1). The
increased NTMs may be related to a higher demand for safe food from high income countries
(Okello and Roy 2007): measures intended to protect human health (i.e., SPSs) account for
52% of total  NTMs. The remaining 48% are export-related measures (17%), price control
measures  (12%),  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  (12%),  and  pre-shipment  inspections  (7%)
(UNCTAD 2017).
The growing and more stringent NTMs may challenge exports of African countries (Broberg,
2009). A limited number of developed countries and emerging economies account for 96% of
total NTMs set against Africa: the United States (22%), Indonesia (21%), Canada (12%), and
Russian Federation (11%) implement more than the half of total NTMs, followed with lower
contribution by Japan (8%), New Zealand (6%), Liberia (5%), Guinea (4%), Gambia (4%),
and Philippines (2%) (UNCTAD 2017).
The rationale of non-tariff measure
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2012, 1) defines non-
tariff  measures (NTMs) as  “policy measures other than ordinary customs tariffs  that can
potentially  have  an economic  effect  on international  trade in  goods,  changing quantities
traded, or prices or both”. Such a definition highlights two features of NTMs. First, NTMs
differ from tariffs (which are protectionist if discriminate against foreign or domestic goods)
and cannot  be directly  compared with them (Swinnen 2016).  Second, NTMs may have a
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corrective role in the marketplace, by reducing asymmetric information (Technical Barriers to
Trade, TBTs), mitigating risks in consumption (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, SPSs),
influencing competition and decisions to import or export (non-technical NTMs1). However,
the UNCTAD’s definition does not specify if NTMs are catalyst  or barriers to trade.  The
vagueness  of  the  definition  is  not  accidental:  the  term “non-tariff  measures”  has  recently
overcame the term “non-tariff  barriers” in order to emphasise that non-tariff  policies may
either friction or facilitate trade (Grant and Arita 2017).
The  trade  effects  of  NTMs  may  differ  according  to  the  economic  relevance  of  country
affected by the measure. Differently from large open economies (e.g. the EU, the US), small
open economies (e.g. African countries) are unable to alter world prices (price-taker) and,
thus, trends in international trade. The effects of NTMs on trade performances of small open
economies depend on the relative economic relevance of countries implementing NTMs.
In order to analyse the catalyst and barrier effects of NTMs, we assume that a large open
economy (i.e., the importing country) sets a non-discriminatory NTM, equivalent in its effect
to the domestic regulation, against exports of a product from a small open economy (i.e., the
exporting country) to maximise domestic welfare (consumers’ surplus and producers’ profits).
1 According to the international classification (UNCTAD 2012), non-technical measures include: contingent trade-protective
measures  (D);  non-automatic  licensing,  quotas,  prohibitions  and  quantity-control  measures  other  than  for  SPS or  TBT
reasons (E); price-control measures, including additional taxes and charges (F); finance measures (G); measures affecting
competition (H); trade-related investment measures (I); distribution restrictions (J); restrictions on post-sales services (K);
subsidies  (L);  government  procurement  restrictions  (M);  intellectual  property  (N);  rules  of  origin  (O);  export-related
measures (P).
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Figure 2. “Catalyst” vs. “barrier” role of non-tariff measures (NTMs): a theoretical framework.
Notes: D and D’ are domestic market demand pre- and post-NTM; S, S’, and S” are domestic market supply pre-NTM,  post-
NTM without foreign competition, and post-NTM with foreign competition; p, p’, and p” are equilibrium price in domestic
market pre-NTM, post-NTM without foreign competition, and post-NTM with foreign competition.
In domestic market, a non-discriminatory NTM shifts rightward the demand (from D to D’)
by reducing market failures (asymmetric information and/or externalities), and leftward the
supply (from S to S’) by increasing the costs of compliance (figure 2). The demand-enhancing
effect (due to an increase in consumers’ utility) is the consequence of greater consumers’ trust
in products under regulation (Xiong and Beghin 2014). The supply-contraction effect (due to
a reduction in producers’ marginal costs) depends on higher costs faced to implement a more
stringent regulation (Crivelli and Gröschl 2016).
The new equilibrium price is higher than the pre-NTM price (from p to p’) (figure 2) and
increases  consumers’  expenditures  and  producers’  revenue.  The  net  effect  on  domestic
welfare  depends  on  the  magnitude  of  gain  in  utility  (for  consumers)  and  revenue  (for
producers),  compared  to  the  size  of  (negative)  effect  on  consumption  expenditures  and
implementation costs: the higher the consumers’ utility, the higher the willingness to pay a
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higher price; the lower the implementation costs, the higher the gain in revenue (Swinnen
2016).
The welfare effects of a non-discriminatory NTM in domestic market are also influenced by
trading partners: NTMs may be protectionist or pro-trade (Marette and Beghin 2010; Sheldon
2012). The domestic market is more competitive (i.e., the supply is more elastic) if the NTM
doesn’t lock out African exporters, and vice-versa. Given the increased consumers demand
for products under regulation in the destination market, changes in the elasticity of supply
(from S’  to  S”)  moves  the  equilibrium price  (from p’  to  p”):  if  the  difference  between
domestic price pre- and post-NTM with foreign competition (p – p”) is lower (greater) than
the  difference  between  domestic  price  pre-  and  post-NTM without  competition  (p  –  p’),
domestic  producers  face  greater  (lower)  implementation  costs  and  obtain  lower  (higher)
profits than foreign producers (figure 2).
( p− p  right ) < left (p-p' right ) NTM   as   catalyst   ## and ## left (p - p⇒NTM   as   catalyst   ## and ## left (p - p )>( p− p ' )⇒NTM   as   catalyst   ## and ## left (p - pNTM as barrier(1)
The NTM has a catalyst  (barrier)  effect  on trade if  determines  an increase (reduction)  in
exports (Swinnen 2017).
The trade effects of NTMs estimated in literature, if different from zero, captures how much a
NTM increases producer costs and, as a consequence, if discriminates between domestic and
foreign  producers.  The  estimated  trade  effect  of  a  NTM is  positive  if  the  NTM is  non-
discriminatory; vice-versa it is negative if the NTM discriminates against imports.
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Methodological approach
Specification of the gravity equation
The vast majority of empirical literature on the trade effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs) is
based on gravity equations (Li and Beghin 2012) which explain trade flows from origin i to
destination  j (Xij) as direct function of economic masses of  i and  j (i.e.,  GDPi and  GDPj),
mitigated by the economic distance between them (i.e.,  proxies of transport  costs,  Zij
k).  A
common gravity specification is as follows:
X ij=α+∑
i
∑
j
( βi+β j)+∑
k
γ k Z ij
k+εij (2)
where α is the constant; βi and βj are fixed effects that proxy the multilateral resistance terms
for  i and  j (including countries’ GDPs);  γk are  k parameters that measure the impact  of  k
bilateral trade costs (e.g. distance, tariffs, NTMs); εij is an i.i.d. error term.
In the above specification the parameter δNTM measures the effect of NTMs on trade: the sign
would reveal the trade-enhancing or trade-impeding effects  of NTMs (Beghin and Bureau
2001).
Sources of heterogeneity across studies
Different  studies  are  likely  to  provide  different  estimates  of  the  parameter  δNTM,  due  to
methodological  and  structural  heterogeneity  across  studies  (Disdier  and  Head  2008).
Methodological heterogeneity relates to differences in statistical and econometric techniques.
Major differences concern the proxy used to measure NTMs: some methodologies include
inventory  measures  (e.g.,  dummy  or  count  variables,  frequency  index,  coverage  ratio,
prevalence score), or  ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) (Gourdon 2014). Relevant differences
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may also be due to the inclusion (or not) of fixed effects and to the treatment (or not) of zero
trade flows. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) suggest to use fixed effects to capture the effect of
multilateral resistance (Anderson and van Wincoop 2001). The problem of zeros is frequent in
trade  data,  probably  due  to  contingent  situation  of  absence  of  trade:  different  estimation
procedures  (e.g.,  Tobit,  Heckman,  Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein,  Poisson  Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood) allow to incorporate zeros in a structural gravity model (Head and Mayer 2014).
Other differences may be related to the functional forms of the model and to different ways to
measure trade flows. The log-log and the log-level models are the most frequent:  the δNTM are
interpreted as elasticity and semi-elasticity, respectively; level-level and level-log models are
also frequently used. Finally, while some studies sum imports and exports, others focus on
uni-directional trade, some use a dependent variable in value terms, other prefer volumes of
trade.
Structural heterogeneity also depends on different sub-populations of the data, in terms of
types  of  NTMs,  products,  involved  countries.  By  pursuing  specific  political  objectives,
different  NTMs  (e.g.,  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Standards,  SPSs,  Technical  Barriers  to
Trade,  TBTs,  Maximum  Residue  Levels,  MRLs)  may  have  different  effects  on  trade
(Schlueter,  Wieck,  and  Heckelei  2009).  In  addition,  NTMs  are  product-specific  by  their
nature: their effect may vary according to the level of aggregation of data (i.e., HS-2 digit,
HS-4 digit, HS-6 digit).
Lastly,  divergences  may also emerge  according to  the geo-economic  affinity  of  countries
implementing  and  affected  by  NTMs:  δNTM estimated  for  trade  between  countries  with
different level of economic development (developed-developing countries) or similar level of
economic development (developed-developed or developing-developing countries) are likely
to differ.
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Sample selection and data collection
Following the guidelines provided by Stanley et al. (2013), we carried out an extensive search
in bibliographic databases (i.e., Scopus, Web of Science, JSTOR, RePEc, IATRC, AgEcon
Search,  Google Scholar)  during the period July-September  2017. Studies  of  interest  were
identified through the keywords “non-tariff measure/non-tariff barrier”, “technical barrier to
trade”,  “sanitary  and  phytosanitary  standard”,  “maximum  residue  level”,  “specific  trade
concern” combined with the terms “agri-food trade” and “Africa/African”. The papers that
appear  more  than  once  in  the  same  bibliographic  database  with  different  keywords  are
counted once (e.g., Otsuki, J.S. Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001a, b; Anders and Caswell 2009;
Drogué and De Maria 2012). On the basis of information available in titles, abstracts, and full
texts,  we  included  empirical  gravity-based  studies  that  quantify  the  effects  of  non-tariff
measures (NTMs) on African agri-food trade. We excluded theoretical papers and studies that
provide  not  comparable  results.  A  flow  chart  describes  in  detail  the  literature  searching
criteria (figure 3).
The final sample consists of 22 papers (16 published in peer-reviewed journals, 6 from grey
literature2), 271 observations (point estimates of trade effects of NTMs), and 256 estimated t-
statistics3.
2 We refer to working papers and conference proceedings.
3 We have 15 missing values for t-statistics due to the lack, in some papers, of standards errors and t-values.
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Peer-reviewed articles Grey literature
Scopus Google Scholar
Web of Science RePEc
JSTOR IATRC
Google Scholar AgEcon Search
Repositories of peer-reviewed journals
Cross-references
Selection of articles on the basis of information contained in the abstract
Articles identified on the basis of keyworks
Exclusion of duplicated articles
Selection of articles on the basis of information contained in the title
Exclusion of articles not focused 
on non-tariff measures
Exclusion of articles not focused 
on the effects of non-tariff 
measures on agri-food trade
Selection of articles on the basis of information contained in the full text
Exclusion of articles not focused 
on African countries
Final sample: 22 articles (16 peer-reviewed papers, 6 working/discussion papers)
Figure 3. Literature searching criteria.
From the selected  papers  we compute  dummy variables  on methodological  and structural
characteristics  of  the  studies.  In  line  with  Stanley,  Doucouliagos,  and  Jarrell  (2008),  we
classified variables in (a) covariates correlated with the estimates but not with the publication
selection  and  (b)  covariates  correlated  with  the  publication  selection  but  not  with  the
estimates.  The  publication  selection  may  bias  estimates  and  undermine  the  validity  of
inferences and policy implications (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). Publication bias may
occur if a particular direction of results (i.e. negative or positive estimates) (type I bias) or
statistically significant results (type II bias) are treated more favourably, thus are more likely
to  be  reported  in  published  studies  (Stanley,  2005).  The  precision  of  the  estimates  (i.e.,
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estimated standard errors) allows to correct for publication selection (Stanley, Doucouliagos,
and Jarrell 2008). Table 1 lists and describes the covariates.
Table 1. Description of covariates and basic statistics.
Covariates Description Type Set*
Mea
n
Standard error Estimated standard error Continuous a 0.930
AVE Ad valorem equivalent used to proxy NTMs Dummy a 0.048
Log-Log form Empirical model expressed in log-log form Dummy a 0.690
Y-exports Exports are the dependent variable Dummy a 0.646
HS-2 digit Product aggregated at 2 digits of Harmonised System Dummy a 0.240
HS-4 digit Product aggregated at 4 digits of Harmonised System Dummy a 0.100
Fixed effects Inclusion of fixed effects for multilateral resistance Dummy b 0.852
Zero trade Treatment of zero trade flows Dummy b 0.424
MRL NTM is a Maximum Residue Level Dummy b 0.373
SPS NTM is a Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard Dummy b 0.373
N-S Origin is developed (North), destination is developing (South) Dummy b 0.871
* Covariates are classified in correlated with the estimates but not with the publication selection (a) and correlated with the
publication selection but not with the estimates (b).
We provide a preliminary analysis of collected through descriptive statistics, boxplots and
kernel densities.
The Meta Regression Analysis
The meta-analysis (MA) is a suitable approach to explain heterogeneity: it allows us to (i)
combine  and  summarise  different  but  comparable  empirical  studies,  (ii)  emphasize  the
heterogeneity  across  studies,  and  (iii)  account  for  potential  publication  bias  (Stanley  and
Doucouliagos 2012).
In line with Santeramo and Shabnam (2015), we regress t-statistics of the estimates (δNTM)4
(i.e.,  t^) on the precision of  δNTM (i.e., the inverse of the estimated standard error,  
1
σ^ ), on  M
4 We use estimated t-statistics instead of the estimated effects of NTMs to avoid problems of heteroschedasticity (Stanley,
2001).
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regressors  correlated  with  δNTM but  not  with  the  publication  selection  (Φm),  and  on  N
regressors correlated with the publication selection but not with δNTM (Ωn):
t^=λ0+ λ1
1
σ^
+∑
m=1
M
φm
Φm
σ^
+∑
n=1
N
ωnΩn+u (3)
The constant (λ0) informs on publication bias, λ1 measures the significance of δNTM5, and u is
an i.i.d. error term. In order to account for potential publication bias, we standardise Φm by the
precision of δNTM.
We  estimate  model  in  equation  (3)  through  a  robust  regression  technique  capable  of
mitigating potential  problems related to outliers and influential  data points (Belsley et  al.,
1980). Influential data points may be due to multiple (correlated) estimates derived by the
same study.
Results and discussion
A qualitative assessment of empirical evidence
An extensive  literature  has  investigated  the  trade  effects  of  non-tariff  measures  (NTMs),
providing contrasting evidence: few studies support the “standards as catalysts” view (e.g., de
Frahan  and  Vancauteren  2006;  Cardamone  2011),  and  the  vast  majority  favours  the
“standards as barriers” hypothesis (e.g., Chen, Yang, and Findlay 2008; Hoekman and Nicita
2011; Peterson, et al. 2013; Dal Bianco, et al. 2016). The same is true for empirical evidence
on NTMs and African trade, but the trade-impeding nature of NTMs prevails (e.g., Otsuki,
J.S. Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001a, b; Anders and Caswell 2009; Drogué and De Maria 2012;
5 In line with previous studies that adopt the meta-analytical approach (e.g., Santeramo and Lamonaca, 2018), the constant
term collects potential  information on the publication selection that are not directly included in the model,  whereas the
coefficient λ1 informs on the significance of the estimated effects of NTMs in that it refers to the inverse of the standard error
associated with the estimated effects of NTMs.
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F.O. Kareem, Brümmer, and Martinez-Zarzoso 2015, 2017), while few studies provide mixed
evidence (J.S. Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Xiong and Beghin 2011; O.I. Kareem 2016a, b, c). As
also suggested in Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009), not all NTMs are binding: on average
binding NTMs are 16% for African countries.
Empirical studies are also heterogeneous in their designs and tend to be country-, product-,
and NTM-specific (table 2)6.
6 Appendix provides descriptive statistics for each of the selected papers (table A.1).
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Table 2. Selected papers.
Authors
Publication Countryb Product NTM Main effect of
NTMs on tradeYear Outlet
a Reporters Partners Commodity Aggregation Measurec Types
Anders S., and Caswell J.A. 2009 AJAE USA
ICs, DCs (2 
ACs)
Fish HS-2 HACCP Mandatory Negative
Disdier A.C., Fekadu B., Murillo C., 
and Wong S.A.
2008 ICTSD WP DCs DCs (1 AC) Tropical HS-6 SPS Mandatory Negative
Drogué S., and De Maria F. 2012 FP ICs, DCs (1 AC) ICs, DCs (1 AC) Apple, pear HS-6 MRL Mandatory Negative
Ferro E., Wilson J.S., and Otsuki T. 2013 WB WP ICs, DCs ICs, DCs Agri-food HS-6 MRL Mandatory Negative
Ferro E., Otsuki T., and Wilson J.S. 2015 FP ICs, DCs ICs, DCs Agri-food HS-6 MRL Mandatory Negative
Gebrehiwet Y., Ngqangweni S., and 
Kirsten J.F.
2007 Agrekon EUN, USA 15 ACs Agri-food HS-2 MRL Mandatory Negative
Jongwanich J. 2009 FP DCs ZAF Processed HS-2 SPS Mandatory Negative
Kareem O.I. 2014a CP EUN 52 ACs Fish, vegetables HS-4 SPS Mandatory Mixed effects
Kareem O.I. 2014b EUI RSCAS WP EUN 52 ACs
Fish, vegetables,
coffee, cocoa
HS-6 SPS Mandatory Mixed effects
Kareem O.I. 2014c WP EUN 52 ACs
Fish, vegetables,
coffee, cocoa
HS-6 SPS Mandatory Mixed effects
Kareem O.I. 2016a ITJ EUN 52 ACs Fish, vegetables HS-6 SPS Mandatory Mixed effects
Kareem O.I. 2016b JAD EUN 52 ACs Fish, coffee HS-6 SPS Mandatory Mixed effects
Kareem O.I. 2016c JCM EUN 52 ACs Fish HS-6 SPS Mandatory Mixed effects
Kareem F.O., Brümmer B., and 
Martinez-Zarzoso I.
2015 Global Food WP EUN 27 ACs Tomato HS-6 MRL; EP Mandatory Negative
Kareem F.O., Brümmer B., and 
Martinez-Zarzoso I.
2017 WE EUN 27 ACs
Tomato, orange,
lime, lemon
HS-6 MRL; EP Mandatory Negative
Otsuki T., Wilson J.S., and Sewadeh 
M.
2001a ERAE CHE, EUN 9 ACs Groundnut HS-6 MRL Mandatory Negative
Otsuki T., Wilson J.S., and Sewadeh 
M.
2001b FP EUN 9 ACs
Cereal, fruit, 
vegetables
HS-2 MRL Mandatory Negative
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Scheepers S., Jooste A., and Alemu 
Z.G.
2007 Agrekon EUN ZAF Avocado HS-6 MRL Mandatory Negative
Shepherd B., and Wilson N.L. 2013 FP EUN DCs (1 AC) Agri-food HS-4 Standards Voluntary Mixed effects
Wilson J.S., Otsuki T., and 
Majumdar B.
2003 JITED AUS, CAN, EUN, 
JPN NZL, USA
DCs (1 AC) Beef HS-6 MRL Mandatory Negative
Wilson J.S., and Otsuki T. 2004 FP
CAN, CHE, EUN, 
JPN, NZL, USA
DCs (4 ACs) Banana HS-6
MRL; 
TRQ
Mandatory Mixed effects
Xiong B., and Beghin J. 2011 ERAE CHE, EUN 9 ACs Groundnut HS-6 MRL Mandatory Mixed effects
a Acronyms are as follows: American Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE), International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Working Paper (WP), Food Policy (FP),
World Bank (WB), International Trade Journal (ITJ), Conference Proceeding (CP), European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI RSCAS), Journal of
African Development (JAD), Journal of Commodity Markets (JCM), The World Economy (WE), European Review of Agricultural Economics (ERAE), Journal of International Trade &
Economic Development (JITED).
b Countries implementing (reporters) and affected by (partners) NTMs are labelled according to the officially assigned ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (UN Statistics Divisions 2018): Argentina
(ARG), Australia (AUS), Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), Switzerland (CHE), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), the European Union (EUN), Japan (JPN), Republic of Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX),
New Zealand (NZL), Russian Federation (RUS), the United States (USA), South Africa (ZAF). ICs and DCs stand for developed (industrialised) countries and developing countries respectively.
c Acronyms are as follows: HACCP stands for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points, SPS stands for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard, MRL stands for Maximum Residue Level, EP
stands for Entry Price, TRQ stands for tariff rate quota.
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The vast majority of empirical literature investigates the trade effects of NTMs implemented
by developed countries (European Union in particular), exception made for Drogué and De
Maria  (2012),  Ferro,  J.S.  Wilson,  and Otsuki  (2013),  and Ferro,  Otsuki,  and J.S.  Wilson
(2015) who analyse wider samples.
NTMs tend to hinder agri-food trade (e.g., Gebrehiwet, Ngqangweni, and Kirsten 2007; Ferro,
J.S. Wilson, and Otsuki 2013; Ferro, Otsuki, and J.S. Wilson 2015), but differences emerge
for specific commodities: trade of bananas (Wilson J.S., and Otsuki 2004) and coffee (e.g.,
O.I.  Kareem 2016b)  is  favoured,  whereas  NTMs hinder  trade  of  seafood  products  (e.g.,
Anders and Caswell  2009; O.I. Kareem 2016c),  beef (J.S. Wilson, Otsuki, and Majumdar
2003),  avocados  (Scheepers,  Jooste,  and  Alemu  2007),  apples  and  pears  (Drogué  and
DeMaria  2012),  tomatoes,  oranges,  and  lemons  (F.O.  Kareem,  Brümmer,  and  Martinez-
Zarzoso 2015, 2015). In addition, trade of groundnuts is negatively affected by beyond-the-
border  policies  (Otsuki,  J.S.  Wilson,  and  Sewadeh  2001a),  but  also  by  domestic  supply
(Xiong and Beghin 2011).
As for specific types of NTMs, some studies on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) provide
mixed  evidence:  Xiong  and  Beghin  (2011)  suggest  that  the  trade  potential  of  African
groundnut  exporters  is  more  constrained  by domestic  capacity  (e.g.,  farming  and storage
practice, other barriers before the border) rather than by limited market access due to NTMs.
More frequently the literature concludes that MRLs are barrier for trade (e.g.,  Otsuki, J.S.
Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001a, b; J.S. Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Scheepers, Jooste, and Alemu
2007).
Sanitary  and Phytosanitary  Standards  (SPSs)  may either  hamper  or  facilitate  trade:  some
studies support the “standards as barrier” view (Disdier, et al. 2008; Jongwanich 2009), while
others provide mixed results  (e.g.,  O.I. Kareem 2016a, b).  A plausible  explanation of the
heterogeneity in findings for SPSs may be the effect of specific regulations: Schlueter, Wieck,
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and Heckelei (2009, 1489) suggest that some types of SPSs have positive impacts and others
have a negative influence. The direction of the effect may also depend on product categories
under investigation. Jongwanich (2009) finds that SPSs implemented by developed countries
impede processed food exports from developing countries; vice-versa, O.I. Kareem (2016a, b)
suggest that the impacts of SPSs on African exports are commodity-specific (at the intensive
margins, SPSs are trade-enhancing  for coffee, but trade-impeding for vegetables, fish, and
cocoa).
Other types of NTMs may be either trade-impeding (i.e., HACCP, Entry Price) (Anders and
Caswell 2009; F.O. Kareem, Brümmer, and Martinez-Zarzoso 2015) or trade-enhancing (i.e.,
tariff-quotas)  (J.S.  Wilson  and  Otsuki  2004).  As  for  the  impact  of  voluntary  standards,
Shepherd and N.L. Wilson (2013) find that harmonised standards are trade-promoting, while
non-harmonised standards are trade-inhibiting, with great differences within specific product
categories.
All in all, empirical literature suggests that MRLs and SPSs friction African agri-food trade,
but marked differences exist across product categories.
Graphical and statistical analysis
Descriptive statistics (table 3) show that 56% of estimates (δNTM) (152) are negative, and the
remaining 44% (119) are positive; 46% are statistically significant, of which 25% (69 out of
271) are negative and 21% (57 out of 271) are positive.
The mean and median values  of (total)  δNTM are,  respectively,  0.533 and -0.020, with the
confidence interval ranging from -3.622 to 4.687. The total variability of observations (point
estimates) is marked, mainly due to higher variability of positive estimates.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the estimates: detail on direction of the effect and statistical significance.
Estimates Min Max Mode (min; max) Median Mean Std. Dev. C.I.a Obs.b
Total -12.162 54.140 -12.162 -2.847; -0.020 -0.020 0.533 4.155 [-3.622; 4.687] 100%
Positive 4.000 54.140 4.000 0.050; 2.711 0.650 2.240 5.582 [-3.342; 7.822] 44%
Negative -12.162 -0.0004 -12.162 -2.847; -0.020 -0.380 -0.804 1.555 [-2.359; 0.752] 56%
Significant -12.162 18.105 -12.162 -0.336 -0.066 0.635 3.360 [-2.725; 3.994] 46%
Significant positive 0.267 18.105 0.267 1.107; 2.711 1.420 2.788 3.384 [-0.596; 6.171] 21%
Significant negative -12.162 -0.015 -12.162 -0.336 -0.670 -1.144 2.055 [-3.199; 0.911] 25%
Not significant -5.683 54.140 -5.683 -2.847; -0.020 -0.015 0.444 4.749 [-4.304; 5.193] 54%
a Confidence interval (C.I.) ranges between mean minus standard deviation (minimum) and mean plus standard deviation (maximum).
b Percentages computed on the total number of observations (271).
c The magnitude of estimates are of the order of 10-15.
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Figure 4 presents the distribution (boxplots) and the kernel densities of statistically significant
total,  positive,  and  negative  δNTM7:  the  first  and  the  third  quartiles  (85  out  of  271  point
estimates)  range between median  values  of  (significant)  negative  (MeNeg. =  -0.45)  and of
(significant) positive (MePos. = 0.92) observations (figure 4, panel (i)). The kernel densities
(referred  either  to  significant  or  not  significant  δNTM)  highlight  differences  between
distributions:  negative  δNTM are  less  dispersed  than  positive  δNTM (in  terms  of  standard
deviations of negative, σNeg. = 1.555, and positive δNTM, σPos. = 5.582) (figure 4, panel (ii)).
The global effect of NTMs does not capture the discrepancy between negative and positive
estimates: negative estimates are more accurate and closer to zero, while positive estimates
are more dispersed.
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Estimates
(i) Distribution
Neg. Tot. Pos.
0
.5
1
1.
5
D
en
si
ty
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Estimates
Neg. Tot. Pos.
(ii) Kernel density estimate
7 Distributions and kernel density estimates in figure 3 refer to a subsample ranging between the 5 th and the 95th percentiles.
Extreme outliers (12%) have been removed to make the distribution less erratic.
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Figure 4. Estimates arranged by direction.
Notes: In panel (i),  the distributions of estimates are on statistically significant observations within the 10 th and the 90th
percentiles. Horizontal lines within boxes are median values (Me) (i.e., MeNeg. = -0.45, MeTot. = 0.13, MePos. = 0.92). In panel
(ii), the estimated densities for estimates are computed removing observations which exceed 10 th and 90th percentiles. Dashed
lines are median values (Me) computed on total observations (i.e., MeTot. = -0.02, MePos. = 0.37, MeNeg. = -0.30).
The mixed evidence found in literature and the high variability of estimates may be partly
explained by methodological and structural differences8. A systematic assessment of potential
sources of heterogeneity is worth.
Meta regression results
The results of the meta regression analysis9 (table 4) show that negative estimates (δNTM) have
negative  publication  bias  (λ0).  In  addition,  we  find  that  the  coefficient  λ1 is  statistically
different from zero for negative δNTM.
Methodological and structural heterogeneity affects positive and negative estimates: negative
δNTM are higher if the empirical model is in log-log form or includes fixed effects, or if a study
adopts  ad  valorem  equivalent (AVE)  to  proxy  NTMs.  Similarly,  Li  and  Beghin  (2012)
pointed  that  the  trade  effects  of  NTMs  are  influenced  by  the  use  of  multilateral  trade
resistance terms.
Using exports as dependent variable in gravity equations (Y-exports) or lower aggregation of
data (HS-4 digit) is associated with larger estimates. The treatment of zero trade flows tends
to distort the estimates: positive δNTM are higher, whereas negative δNTM are lower. In line with
Li and Beghin (2012, 507) “t-values becomes more negative by retaining zero-trade”.
8 As an example, table A.2 and figure A.1 in Appendix show descriptive statistics, and boxplots and kernel density estimates
of δNTM arranged by types of NTMs.
9 Our empirical model involves several dichotomous variables: potential collinearity may arise and confound estimation
results. We check the data to control for potential collinearity. We dropped the covariates with the relative higher variance
inflation index (VIF): “Inventory”, “Log-Level form”, “Level-Level form”, “Y-imports”, “Y-value”, “Y-volume”, “HS-6 digit”
and “Other NTMs”. Collinearity diagnostics without the problematic covariates show no additional problems.
22
The type of NTMs under investigation does matter: negative δNTM are lower if studies deepen
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) or Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs). In
particular, MRLs are related to larger positive δNTM. The twofold effect of MRLs may be due
to the facts that “the NTM is clearly identified rather than being some aggregate measure of
heterogeneous policies” (Li and Beghin 2012, 508).
Table 4. Results of the meta regression analysis.
Covariates Positive δNTM Negative δNTM
Constant (λ0)
-0.437 -2.858 ***
(0.758) (0.735)
1/σ (λ1)
-3.570 -0.117 ***
(0.249) (0.014)
AVE (φ1)
-0.004 0.054 ***
(0.013) (0.018)
Log-Log form (φ2)
0.150 0.070 ***
(0.264) (0.021)
Y-exports (φ3)
0.244 *** 0.048 **
(0.026) (0.018)
HS-2 digit (φ4)
0.059 -0.109
(0.041) (0.079)
HS-4 digit (φ5)
0.456 *** 0.128 ***
(0.025) (0.032)
Fixed effects (ω1)
-0.597 2.676 ***
(0.437) (0.719)
Zero trade (ω2)
1.126 *** -0.757 **
(0.336) (0.370)
MRL (ω3)
1.952 *** -0.888 *
(0.541) (0.492)
SPS (ω4)
0.503 -0.919 *
(0.617) (0.510)
N-S (ω5)
0.696 0.027
(0.502) (0.486)
Observations 113 139
R-squared 0.834 0.563
Notes:
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
The magnitude of estimated coefficients and related standard errors for variables ‘Publication bias’ and ‘Log-Log form’ are
of the order of 10-15 in models “Positive δNTM”.
Acronyms are as follows: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard (SPS), Maximum Residue Level (MRL), North-South (N-S),
ad valorem equivalent (AVE), Harmonised System (HS).
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To  sum  up,  positive  δNTM tend  to  be  larger  in  some  cases  (if  associated  with  exports,
disaggregated data, treatment of zeros, MRLs), but are less affected by heterogeneity across
studies  than  negative  δNTM.  In  fact,  structural  heterogeneity  underestimates,  whereas
methodological  heterogeneity  (exception  made  for  the  treatment  of  zeros)  overestimates
negative δNTM.
Concluding remarks
The proliferation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) has stimulated a growing empirical literature
on their effects on the agri-food trade, but the global impact of NTMs is not clear cut: the
hypotheses of NTMs either as catalysts and barriers coexist.
We reviewed a set of empirical studies on the trade effects of NTMs in the African agri-food
sector,  through  a  meta-analytical  approach,  in  order  to  address  two  main  concerns:
disentangle the prevailing effect in literature and identify factors affecting the heterogeneity in
the estimated effects.
We found that, in literature, the trade-impeding effect of NTMs prevails: in our sample, the
negative  estimates  are  widespread and less erratic  than the positive  ones.  The NTMs are
mostly barriers for trade: the African producers tend face greater costs of compliance with
NTMs and obtain lower profits than producers in the destination markets. An NTM locks out
African  exporters  from  the  destination  market  (where  the  NTM  is  implemented),  that
becomes less competitive, favouring domestic producers.
Our findings also suggest that the heterogeneity in the estimated effects is partly explained by
methodological and structural differences across empirical studies. In particular, we showed
that positive estimates are less affected by heterogeneity, whereas negative estimates tend to
be exaggerated by methodological issues and lowered by structural differences. Our results
reveal that, although differences exist across commodities, Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs)
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and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) implemented by developed countries are
likely to friction African agri-food trade. In this regard, since the 2004, the Trade Ministers of
G-90, the Alliance of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, the African Union,
and the Least Developed Countries, asked to the  “WTO members [to] exercise restraint in
applying TBT and SPS measures to products of G-90 countries and [to] provide technical
and financial assistance for compliance with SPS and TBT requirements for the export of G-
90 agricultural commodities” (Disdier et al., 2008, p. 336).
In line with previous studies (Santeramo et al. 2018), our analysis highlights that the trade
effects tend to be NTM-specific: however, literature generally deepens on measures intended
to  protect  human  health  (i.e.,  SPSs,  MRLs),  but  neglects  other  measures  frequently
implemented against African agri-food products (i.e., export-related measures, price control
measures, Technical Barriers to Trade, pre-shipment inspections). Some research areas are
still  unexplored:  in  particular,  the  impacts  of  NTMs implemented  by major  reporters  for
Africa (i.e., Indonesia, Russian Federation, Liberia, Guinea, Gambia, and Philippines) have
not been yet investigated.  In addition,  developing countries have moved from negative to
positive (and steadily growing) protection in the agri-food sector, with implications for trade
not completely known (Martin 2018).
Our paper would be a toolkit for academics and policymakers to understand the prevailing
effects  of  NTMs on African trade. In particular,  policymakers  aiming at  introducing new
NTMs should  carefully  take  into  consideration  the  peculiarity  of  the  trade  effects  across
products and types of measures.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics for selected papers.
Country ISO-3 digit Country area Rank
High income
Nigeria NGA West Africa 1
Egypt EGY North Africa 2
South Africa ZAF Southern Africa 3
Algeria DZA North Africa 4
Angola AGO Southern Africa 5
Morocco MAR North Africa 6
Sudan SDN North Africa 7
Libya LBY North Africa 8
Ethiopia ETH East Africa 9
Kenya KEN East Africa 10
Ghana GHA West Africa 11
United Repuplic of Tanzania TZA East Africa 12
Medium income
Tunisia TUN North Africa 13
Côte d'Ivoire CIV West Africa 14
Cameroon CMR Central Africa 15
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Uganda UGA East Africa 16
Zambia ZMB Southern Africa 17
Mozambique MOZ Southern Africa 18
Botswana BWA Southern Africa 19
Zimbabwe ZWE Southern Africa 20
Congo COG Central Africa 21
Senegal SEN West Africa 22
Gabon GAB Central Africa 23
Mauritius MUS Southern Africa 24
Namibia NAM Southern Africa 25
Burkina Faso BFA West Africa 26
Madagascar MDG East Africa 27
Benin BEN West Africa 28
Rwanda RWA East Africa 29
Niger NER West Africa 30
Guinea GIN West Africa 31
Malawi MWI Southern Africa 32
Mali MLI West Africa 33
Sierra Leone SLE West Africa 34
Low income
34
Mauritania MRT North Africa 35
Togo TGO West Africa 36
Burundi BDI East Africa 37
Lesotho LSO Southern Africa 38
Cabo Verde CPV West Africa 39
Central African Republic CAF Central Africa 40
Djibouti DJI East Africa 41
Gambia GMB West Africa 42
Eritrea ERI East Africa 43
Comoros COM East Africa 44
Guinea-Bissau GNB West Africa 45
Sao Tome and Principe STP Central Africa 46
Source: elaboration on UN (2017) and CEPII (2017).
Notes:  Considering the distribution of African countries’ GDPs, a country is low income if  GDP is lower than the 25 th
percentile, medium income if GDP range between the 25 th and the 75th percentile, high income if GDP is higher than the 75 th
percentile.
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Table A.2. Descriptive statistics for selected papers.
References Obs. Positive obs. Positive significant obs. Negative obs. Negative significant obs. Me μ σ Min Max
Anders S., and Caswell J.A. (2009) 17 3 1 14 12 -0.42 -0.35 0.40 -0.92 0.50
Disdier A.C., Fekadu B., Murillo C., and Wong S.A. (2008) 80 22 4 58 20 -0.25 -0.14 0.91 -1.91 5.11
Drogué S., and De Maria F. (2012) 8 3 - 5 3 -0.04 -0.04 0.12 -0.23 0.12
Ferro E., Wilson J.S., and Otsuki T. (2013) 15 2 1 13 4 -0.96 -1.03 2.11 -5.68 4.46
Ferro E., Otsuki T., and Wilson J.S. (2015) 10 6 1 4 2 0.14 1.11 2.88 -0.23 9.22
Gebrehiwet Y., Ngqangweni S., and Kirsten J.F. (2007) 2 2 2 - - 0.39 0.39 0.03 0.37 0.41
Jongwanich J. (2009) 1 1 1 - - 0.05 0.05 - 0.05 0.05
Kareem O.I. (2014a) 2 1 1 1 1 0.81 0.81 3.55 -1.71 3.32
Kareem O.I. (2014b) 4 1 1 3 2 -1.59 -3.16 6.42 -12.16 2.71
Kareem O.I. (2014c) 4 1 1 3 2 -1.59 -3.16 6.42 -12.16 2.71
Kareem O.I. (2016a) 8 5 1 3 2 0.00 -0.42 0.99 -2.85 0.07
Kareem O.I. (2016b) 2 1 1 1 1 1.76 1.76 6.11 -2.57 6.08
Kareem O.I. (2016c) 5 4 1 - 0.00 10.27 24.55 -2.85 54.14
Kareem F.O., Brümmer B., and Martinez-Zarzoso I. (2015) 12 4 3 8 7 -0.07 3.72 6.91 -1.51 18.11
Kareem F.O., Brümmer B., and Martinez-Zarzoso I. (2017) 21 15 11 6 3 3.73 2.89 2.78 -0.09 6.89
Otsuki T., Wilson J.S., and Sewadeh M. (2001a) 25 23 3 2 1 0.88 1.25 1.38 -0.91 5.20
Otsuki T., Wilson J.S., and Sewadeh M. (2001b) 2 2 2 - - 0.74 0.74 0.44 0.43 1.05
Scheepers S., Jooste A., and Alemu Z.G. (2007) 1 1 1 - - 0.26 0.26 - 0.26 0.26
Shepherd B., and Wilson N.L. (2013) 25 6 4 19 16 -0.03 -0.58 0.94 -3.80 0.47
Wilson J.S., and Otsuki T. (2004) 3 3 3 - - 1.45 1.42 0.07 1.34 1.48
Wilson J.S., Otsuki T., and Majumdar B. (2003) 2 2 2 - - 0.59 0.59 0.01 0.58 0.59
Xiong B., and Beghin J. (2011) 24 11 3 13 5 -0.01 0.34 0.98 -0.72 3.00
Table A.3. Descriptive statistics of the estimates: detail on types of measures.
Estimates Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. C.I.a Obs.b
Maximum Residue Level (MRL)
Total -5.683 18.105 0.580 1.509 3.268 [-1.759; 4.778] 37%
Positive 0.008 18.105 1.139 2.630 3.381 [-0.751; 6.012] 25%
Negative -5.683 -0.0010 -0.435 -0.800 1.129 [-1.929; 0.328] 12%
Significant -2.980 18.105 1.107 2.080 3.675 [-1.595; 5.756] 21%
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Significant positive 0.008 18.105 1.501 3.146 3.715 [-0.568; 6.861] 15%
Significant negative -2.980 -0.181 -0.556 -0.904 0.822 [-1.726; -0.083] 6%
Not significant -5.683 9.222 0.099 0.770 2.502 [-1.732; 3.272] 16%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard (SPS)
Total -12.162 6.077 -0.240 -0.345 2.117 [-2.462; 1.772] 37%
Positive 4.030 d 6.077 0.265 0.980 1.555 [-0.575; 2.535] 12%
Negative -12.162 -0.0100 -0.390 -0.960 2.068 [-3.028; 1.109] 25%
Significant -12.162 6.077 -0.485 -0.536 3.908 [-4.444; 3.372] 10%
Significant positive 0.267 d 6.077 2.711 2.811 1.968 [0.843; 4.779] 3%
Significant negative -12.162 -0.300 -0.750 -2.122 3.596 [-5.718; 1.475] 7%
Not significant -2.847 1.310 -0.170 -0.272 0.691 [-0.963; 0.419] 27%
Otherc
Total -3.796 54.140 -0.062 0.389 6.607 [-6.219; 6.996] 25%
Positive 4.000 d 54.140 0.050 2.965 12.394 [-9.429; 15.359] 7%
Negative -3.796 -0.0004 -0.197 -0.591 0.777 [-1.368; 0.187] 18%
Significant -3.796 0.468 -0.408 -0.576 0.783 [-1.359; 0.207] 15%
Significant positive 0.015 0.468 0.248 0.244 0.232 [0.012; 0.476] 2%
Significant negative -3.796 -0.015 -0.604 -0.716 0.758 [-1.475; 0.042] 13%
Not significant -2.847 54.140 -0.001 1.801 10.274 [-8.473; 12.075] 10%
a Confidence interval (C.I.) ranges between mean minus standard deviation (minimum) and mean plus standard deviation (maximum).
b Percentages computed on the total number of observations (271).
c ‘Other’ includes tariff rate quotas, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), voluntary standards, entry price.
d The magnitude of ETEMs are of the order of 10-15.
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Figure A.1. Estimated trade effect of measures (ETEMs) arranged by types of measures.
Notes: Types of measure are as follows: Maximum Residue Level (MRL), Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard (SPS), Other
(includes tariff rate quotas, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), voluntary standards, entry price). In panel
(i), the distributions of estimates are on observations within the 10 th and the 90th percentiles. Horizontal lines within boxes are
median values (Me) (i.e., MeMRL = 0.26, MeSPS = -0.18, MeOther = -0.03). In panel (ii), the estimated densities for estimates are
computed removing observations which exceed the 10th and the 90th percentiles. Dashed lines are median values (Me).
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